# Unveiling $u^*$ : A State-level Approach

Nic Pusateri
Sacred Heart University


Southern Economic Assocaition Meetings 2024
Washington, DC


## Defining $u^*$ a la Michaillat and Saez 2024


Full Employment Rate of Unemployment (FERU)


$$u^* = \sqrt{u * v}$$


- Geometric Average of Unemployment and Vacancy Rate
- Key Benefits
  - Derived from Beveridge Curve Logic
  - Data Availability
  - Simplicity
  - Active Role for *u*\* (Hall and Kudlyak 2024)











### **Two-Way Fixed Effects Model**

Model Specification:

$$u_{it}^* = \alpha + \beta_1 StateReg_{it} + \beta_2 StateShocks_{it} + \beta_3 \mathbf{C}_{it} + \delta_i + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}$$

- StateReg<sub>it</sub>: Labor market regulations
- StateShocks<sub>it</sub>: Sectoral labor share shocks
- $\circ$  **C**<sub>it</sub>: Vector of additional controls, including:
  - State-level Controls
  - National-level Controls
- Fixed Effects:  $\delta_i$ : State fixed effects;  $\gamma_t$ : Time fixed effects.

#### Data (2001m1-2023m12)

- Monthly
  - State labor market regulations: minimum wage
  - State sectoral labor share shocks
  - State CEAL
  - o National-level controls: inflation, industrial production, sectoral shocks
- Yearly
  - State labor market regulations: count of labor statutes
  - $\circ \Delta$  state population

# 1 Standard Deviation Increase – Standard Deviation Impact on $u^*$

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Minimum Wage	.13**	.13**			.16**	.16**
	(.06)	(.06)			(.06)	(.06)
Labor Statutes			.28**	.28**	.24*	.24**
			(.12)	(.12)	(.13)	(.12)
State Sectoral Shocks	.05	.08	01	.03	0	.04
	(0.4)	(.18)	(.19)	(.18)	(.19)	(.18)
State Controls	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
National Controls		$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$		$\checkmark$
State FE	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$
Time FE	М	Q	М	Q	М	Q
N	13,069					

#### **Implications**

- Significant Variation in *u*\* by State
- States policy choices significantly impact  $u^*$  (+/- 2%)
- One-size fits all policy concerns
- State policy incentives